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23-02-2015

Daesh, Libya and chemical weapons

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“Daesh found chemical weapons” is the new unfounded alarm coming from Libya.

Libyan chemical weapons’ history started in early 80es when Libya was struggling to obtain regional leadership. After years of high political tension, the new millennium happened to be the turning point as Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 2004.

The CWC classifies chemicals in three Categories (or Schedules):

  • ·         Schedule 1: chemicals that have been or can be easily used as chemical weapons and which have very limited, if any, uses for peaceful purposes,
  • ·         Schedule 2: chemicals that are precursors to, or that in some cases can themselves be used as, chemical weapons agents, but which have also commercial uses
  • ·         Schedule 3: chemicals that can be used to produce, or can be used as, chemical weapons, but which are widely used for peaceful purposes.

When Libya joined the CWC, it declared the possession of:

  • ·         24.7 metric tonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard (Schedule 1);
  • ·         1,390 MT of precursor chemicals;
  • ·         3,563 unloaded chemical aerial bombs;
  • ·         3 production facilities.

When Gaddafi era ended, the new government declared the existence of previously undeclared stockpile consisting of:

  • ·         several hundred munitions loaded with sulphur mustard (Schedule 1);
  • ·         few hundreds kilograms of sulphur mustard stored in plastic containers (Schedule 1);
  • ·        a limited number of unfilled plastic containers.

At present:

  • ·         all Category 1 weapons (sulphur mustard stockpile and sulphur mustard-filled munitions) have been destroyed,
  • ·         all Category 3 weapons have been destroyed,
  • ·         two the former production facilities have been destroyed while the third one has been converted to pharmaceuticals manufacturing facility,
  • ·         there are about 850 MT of Category 2 precursor chemicals and remaining polymerized agent «which, although toxic, cannot be used for filling chemical weapons»[1] that still have to be destroyed (by 2016).

Considering what was said above, the threat at issue is unfounded: Category 1 and Category 3 weapons have been destroyed and Category 2 precursor chemical cannot be considered as ready-to-use weapons[2].

Even if Daesh-linked militias found some stockpiles unknown to OPCW, threats to Italy would still be non-existent: ground delivered weapons’ range (mortar, artillery rockets or missiles) is too short to hit Italy and air delivered weapons cannot be used since they do have neither planes nor pilots. Moreover, they would not be able to produce new munitions since they do not have either the tools or the capabilities to do so.

So, why are such unfounded news constantly reported by the media? Could it be a conditioning strategy anticipating a military intervention in Libya? Although this kind of initiatives, aimed to protect political and economic national interests is accepted by political realism, such mystification of reality cannot be justified. 



[1] Source: Interview with Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General OPCW (opcw.org).

[2] Data source: opcw.org.

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Alessandro Mazzilli

Degree in International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Turin.

Expert in Foreign Policy of Defence and Security and the relationships Euro - Atlantic.

Geopolitical analyst.

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