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12-12-2013

THE AGREEMENT ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR

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After the historic phone call between Obama and the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Rohani, states that followed the tractive diplomatic ties with Tehran, and the United States, France, Britain, Russia, China and Germany (P5 + 1) and Iran have finally reached an agreement on the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic.

The agreement can be summarized in five points:

  • Iran will stop the enrichment of uranium above 5 percent and reduce its reserves of uranium enriched to more than this percentage;
  • Tehran will have to authorize the International Agency for Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) to inspect nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow
  • There will be no expansion of the Arak;
  • Iran will also receive an easing of sanctions for about $ 7 billion.
  • The two facility at Natanz and Fordow were included in the terms of the agreement just because they represented the military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program.

In the Fordow facility , built inside a mountain and therefore among the most protected Iran's nuclear infrastructure , enriching fissionable material was 20%, thanks to a new generation of centrifuges much faster and more efficient in carbon fiber. The technology used for the enrichment did not give sufficient justification for purely civilian purposes.

The introduction of centrifuges of the second generation , both in the infrastructure that Fordow underground Natanz , would have made Tehran able to generate enriched uranium in measuring extremely fast (approximately three times compared to the present time).

The complex at Natanz[1], located 200 miles south of Tehran ( between Isfahan and Kashan in central Iran ) was constructed almost entirely underground[2]. There were 160 cars assembled for the Pakistani gas centrifuge technology , which would have allowed us to produce enriched uranium for a nuclear reactor of 1,000 megawatts and assemble three nuclear weapons a year.

The deadline for the Iranian Atomic was already in place , therefore , Tehran was already getting close to 70 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 % ( one sixth of highly enriched uranium needed to assemble a nuclear weapon ) . Facility in Natanz , would have been sufficient third of the 3000 new generation centrifuges , in addition to 9000 devices already operating , to produce enriched uranium with higher percentages of 20%.

No problem, however, for the procurement of nuclear fuel, according to analysis Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran since the beginning of 2014 Tehran could count on cd thanks uranium yellowcake uranium ore compact and Bandar Abbas and Yazd and Isfahan Central.

In the political strategy of the former Iranian President, Ahmadinejad , nuclear power accounted for both a right and a necessity. The extreme geopolitical and economic instability in the Middle East chessboard Tehran induced to believe that they would have a greater impact on the imbalances of the persuasive relying on military means to deploy its interference in other countries and threaten Israel. The dream hegemonic Ahmadinejad did not yet , as far as the internal dissensions and conflicts were repressed with violence and systematic nature of the antibodies needed for the leap . On the other hand , the heavy economic conditions had not spared that Iran was in the complicated situation of having to combine domestic economic difficulties with the need to provide effective ongoing nuclear threat.

The containment measures taken by the international community have certainly served to increase the internal pressure and to promote the overall change of the strategy of the Islamic Republic , forcing , even in this case, to enter into diplomatic negotiations , then led to the understanding of Geneva which provides as already mentioned, an easing of economic sanctions in exchange for freezing its nuclear program.

The measures taken so far by the international community and the oil embargo by the European Union itself have been too modest.

The countries of U . E. had agreed an embargo on Iran oil , sterilizing relations with the Central Bank in order to complicate , if not impossible to make payments by Iranian entities of products purchased by European companies.

They also included the inability to invest in the petrochemical industry and to mint coins and banknotes on behalf of the Central Bank of Iran. The sanctions, adopted immediately after freezing the assets of 433 Iranian companies and 113 people , have imposed heavy restrictions on exports of sensitive products and banned many investments in the hydrocarbon sector.

The embargo , however , turned out to be a boomerang for the most vulnerable eurozone countries are currently : The EU imports about 500 thousand barrels per day from Iran, which is the most important supplier of oil to Greece. The further ineffectiveness of sanctions was also due to the fact that Tehran could buy goods and services from other countries not involved embargo . In the opening, Russia and China.

The effectiveness of international inspections could prove to be decisive only if Iran also underwrite the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty . Otherwise , without the full and continuing cooperation of the Islamic Republic , the inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency is devoid of any function and authority, as was the case for the facility at Qom , the construction of which was started in May 2005, when Iran was still obligated to notify the IAEA "as soon as the decision to construct , or to authorize construction to modify Has Been taken".

Tehran has confirmed the construction of infrastructure years after the construction of the first underground tunnels , severely limiting the activities of international verification and out into the open only after it was discovered the existence of the facility.

The need for an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue was due because, otherwise , an ambition Tehran could guide the countries in the area to balance military capabilities , supporting rearmament which would have paved the way for a cold war in the Middle East.

Certainly the use of military solutions , with a pre-emptive military attack limited only to facilities involved in Iran's nuclear program was , according to its proponents , is essential because the alternatives ( economic sanctions, international inspections , diplomatic negotiations , etc.). Would have helped to slow the realization of Iran's nuclear program , but not its termination , the imminent nuclear threat would justify self-defense.

The Geneva Agreement , together with the first direct communication between the Presidents of the United States and Iran since 1979 , breaking a silence that had lasted from the diplomatic rupture of bilateral relations between the two countries, has reinstated officially Tehran in the international community. Iran is still the first political supporter of the Assad regime in Syria due to the Shiite militia Hezbollah and to a lesser extent Hamas , Tehran without Bashar al-Assad may no longer be in power. For the next six months Tehran will also be protected from possible Israeli military raid on his military facility, its influence in the area will continue to increase significantly.

The hope is that in these six months Tehran to sign the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty , which allows very stringent checks and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency , making it permanent effects of an agreement that is definitely positive but that is still not enough to make credible the intention of Iran to develop a nuclear program solely for civilian purposes.



[1] http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz.htm

[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz-imagery3.htm

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Fabrizio Minniti

Graduated in law is the author of numerous publications on against nuclear proliferation, military policy and terrorism.

For the Military Centre for Strategic Studies was Military Researcher and Director of the following research reports: "Nuclear proliferation and the threat of fundamentalist," "The Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policy", "The communication strategy of Al Qaeda" , "information sources and Open Source Intelligence".

At the National Institute of General Staff Command (ISSMI) of the Defence attended the 9th Course for Legal Advisor in the Armed Forces and the 33th Civil Military Cooperation Course, at SIOI Rome he obtained a Master in Geopolitics "the new world: the powers of anarchy".

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